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1 Introduction
Technological knowledge diﬀuses across the boundaries of open economies.1 As a
consequence, backward countries with access to the knowledge contained in the
world’s technological frontier, may adopt this knowledge and, thereby, grow faster
than advanced countries (Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz (1986)). This paper de-
velops a new open-economy endogenous growth model where this mechanism allows
for a stable and non-degenerate world income distribution. The purpose is to detect
both country characteristics and properties of the growth process that explain a
country’s position in the eventual world income distribution.
From a macroeconomic point of view, international technology diﬀusion is the pro-
cess by which domestic ﬁrms incorporate new ideas and techniques from abroad into
their production technology and, thereby, raise the productivity of the available do-
mestic factors of production. At the microeconomic level, I motivate this process
by what Griﬃth, Redding, and Reenen (2004) call the second face of R&D, i.e.,
the fact that ﬁrms engaged in innovation activity acquire external knowledge and
assimilate discoveries of others.2 From this point of view, the intensity of domestic
innovation activity becomes a key determinant of a country’s capacity to absorb
previously unknown technological knowledge from abroad.
Following Nelson and Phelps (1966), the second component of the diﬀusion process
is the gap between the state of the world’s technological frontier and a country’s
current state of technological knowledge. This gap represents the pool of ideas and
techniques from which the second face of R&D can draw. I take the view that no
country has access to the entire knowledge embodied in the world’s technological
frontier. Hence, over time, the technology gap may rise or fall, however, it remains
positive throughout. In a steady state, each country absorbs a constant fraction of
the world’s technological frontier. The remaining steady-state gap turns out to be
a key determinant of a country’s relative position in the steady-state world income
distribution.
I refer to international technology diﬀusion as the foreign contribution to the ad-
vancement of a country’s accessible level of technological knowledge. The domestic
contribution reﬂects the ﬁrst face of R&D, i.e., research and development of new
1Recent empirical studies in support of this include Coe and Helpman (1995), Eaton and Kortum
(1996), Nadiri and Kim (1996), and Coe, Helpman, and Hoﬀmaister (2008).
2Besides Griﬃth, Redding, and Reenen (2004), there is considerable support for this motive
in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Tilton (1971), Allen (1977), Mowery (1983)). Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) study the implications of such activity for partial industry equilibria.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 2
technological knowledge undertaken by domestic ﬁrms. Overall, the evolution of
a country’s accessible level of technological knowledge is given by the sum of the
domestic and the foreign contribution.
The set-up of the domestic economy adds a competitive intermediate-good sector
to an otherwise neoclassical economy to incorporate endogenous economic growth.3
Innovation investments are undertaken by intermediate-good ﬁrms in an attempt to
gain an advantage over rivals. These investments are endogenously determined, raise
the productivity of domestic labor, and, as a byproduct, bring about a knowledge
inﬂow from abroad.
For this set-up, I establish the intertemporal general equilibrium and the existence
of a unique steady state that pins down a country’s capital intensity and its rel-
ative position with respect to the world’s technological frontier. Similar to other
theoretical studies of technology diﬀusion, including Parente and Prescott (1994),
Barro and Sala-´ ı-Martin (1997), or Howitt (2000), all economies share the same
steady-state growth rate of per-capita magnitudes which coincides with the exoge-
nous growth rate of the world’s technological frontier. However, diﬀerences in the
level of technological knowledge survive even in the steady state and cause cross-
country income diﬀerences, a feature consistent with empirical ﬁndings of, e.g., Hall
and Jones (1999).
A particular focus of the analysis is on human capital and on growth policies based
on subsidies for innovation investments. Besides its static labor-augmenting eﬀect in
the spirit of Becker (1993) and Mincer (1974), I argue that human capital is favorable
to innovation because it reduces the amount of resources necessary to adapt to or
to invent something new. This follows ideas expressed in, e.g., Nelson and Phelps
(1966), Schultz (1975), or Galor and Moav (2000). However, in my context where
economic growth is endogenous, the positive eﬀect of human capital on domestic
innovation and technology diﬀusion may be oﬀset by general equilibrium eﬀects.
The latter implies that the rate of diﬀusion, i.e., the rate at which the gap between
the technological frontier and the current state of the domestic technology closes,
does not necessarily increase in human capital. Thus, the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis
(Nelson and Phelps (1966), p. 70) fails in general. In a similar vein, I ﬁnd that the
partial equilibrium eﬀect of a subsidy on innovation investments is positive but may
be outweighed by general equilibrium eﬀects.
What determines steady-state income diﬀerences across countries? I ﬁnd that an
economy’s size, its available research technology, properties of the diﬀusion pro-
3The analytical framework extends and complements the endogenous growth model developed
in Irmen (2005). The latter, in turn, builds on Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and Bester and Petrakis
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cess, and the behavioral assumption on savings determine both the set of country
characteristics that matter and the sign of the predicted eﬀect. However, for open
economies that engage in innovation activity the analysis shows that independent
of these categories a) a social infrastructure that fosters the eﬃciency of an econ-
omy’s domestic production technology, and b) institutions that facilitate the inﬂow
of technological knowledge from abroad increase a country’s position in the steady-
state world income distribution. Such countries beneﬁt more from their own R&D
and from international R&D spillovers. This is in line with the empirical evidence
provided by, e.g., Hall and Jones (1999), Sachs and Warner (1995), or Coe, Help-
man, and Hoﬀmaister (2008). Moreover, a high savings rate and a small population
growth rate imply a high steady-state per-capita income, a ﬁnding consistent with
the correlations that appear in the data provided by Heston, Summers, and Aten
(2002) (see, e.g., Weil (2005), p. 70 and 84).
The role of human capital and of subsidies for innovation investments as deter-
minants of cross-country income diﬀerences is strengthened if the savings rate is
endogenous ` a la Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965). In this setting the
steady-state capital intensity is pinned down by a ﬁrst-order condition rather than
by a market equilibrium condition. As a result, the general equilibrium eﬀects in
the comparative statics disappear. Both variables tend to raise domestic research
activity and, thereby, increase a country’s capacity to absorb knowledge embodied
in the technological frontier. Through both channels the steady-state per-capita
income rises.
Several studies of the evolution of the world’s income distribution question the view
according to which all countries converge to parallel growth paths (see, e.g., Quah
(1997), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), or Pritchet (1997)). My framework highlights
two mechanisms in support of this view. Both are consistent with the observation
of a growing divergence between the world’s richest and poorest countries and with
the presence for convergence clubs in growth rates.
First, countries may be closed, i.e., cut-oﬀ from the evolution of the world’s tech-
nological frontier. Historical examples include China’s isolationism starting in the
15th century AD or Japan’s isolationism ending in the mid 19th century AD. I show
that closing an economy means that it falls behind forever because growth relies
solely on domestic innovation eﬀorts. The example of China is a case in point (see,
e.g. Mokyr (1990), Chapter 9, or Landes (1998), p. 93-97). I ﬁnd that the country
characteristics that generate level eﬀects in the open economy induce also growth
eﬀects in the closed economy. Hence, country characteristics determine whether
closed economies converge to parallel growth paths or not.
Second, an open economy may be caught up in a no-innovation trap if country
characteristics prevent proﬁt-maximizing domestic ﬁrms from engaging in innovationCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 4
investments. As a consequence, the second face of R&D is mute. The country
does not absorb technological knowledge from abroad and converges to a stationary
steady state as in Solow (1956). For such a setting, I show that a minimum level
of human capital is necessary to induce innovation activity in equilibrium. This is
consistent Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) who claim for a sample of 84 countries that a
minimum level of human capital corresponding to an average 1.78 years of schooling
in 1960 was necessary to catch up with US total factor productivity growth over the
following 35 years.
The paper is organized as follows. I present the details of the model in Section
2. Section 3 studies the intertemporal general equilibrium and characterizes the
dynamical system. Section 4 extends the basic model in three directions. First,
I consider an endogenous savings rate generated by inﬁnitely lived dynasties in
Section 4.1. The closed economy and the implications for club convergence are
analyzed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 studies the possibility no-innovation traps.
Section 5 concludes. All proves are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
The economy has a household sector, a ﬁnal-good sector, and an intermediate-
good sector in an inﬁnite sequence of periods t = 1,2,... There are four objects
of exchange, a manufactured ﬁnal good, a manufactured intermediate good, labor,
and bonds. I call ‘ﬁnal good’ a commodity that serves for consumption as well as
for investment. If invested, this commodity is either used as future capital in the
ﬁnal-good sector or as an immediate input into innovation undertaken by ﬁrms of
the intermediate-good sector.
In each period t, there are markets for all four objects of exchange. Treating the
ﬁnal good as the num´ eraire, pt denotes the real price of the intermediate good, wt
the real hourly wage. A bond at t is a claim on one unit of the ﬁnal good at t + 1.
Accordingly, the price of a bond at t is 1/(1 + rt+1), where rt+1 is the real interest
rate from t to t + 1.
2.1 The Household Sector
The household sector has an initial endowment of B1 bonds coming due at t = 1
and owns the shares of all ﬁrms in the economy. In each period it is equipped with
a labor endowment of Lt hours of time that coincides with the aggregate supply of
labor. Due to population growth, this endowment grows at a constant rate λ > (−1)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 5
such that Lt = (1 + λ)
t−1 for t ≥ 1 with L1 = 1 given as an initial condition. Let
h ≥ 1 denote the level of human capital that augments each hour worked.





= wt Lt + Bt + Πt − Tt, (2.1)
where Ct is consumption of the ﬁnal good, Bt+1 is bond demand in t, wt Lt is
wage income, Bt is capital income from the repayment of bonds due in t, Πt is
the aggregate dividend distribution, and Tt denotes the lump-sum tax levied by the
government to ﬁnance possible subsidies for innovation investments.
As to the consumption-savings decision of the household sector I assume that real
aggregate savings in t is a ﬁxed fraction of aggregate income in t, i.e.,4
Bt+1
1 + rt+1
= s(wt Lt + Bt + Πt − Tt), (2.2)
with s ∈ (0,1) denoting the marginal and average propensity to save.
2.2 The Final-Good Sector
The ﬁnal-goodsector produces according to the production function Yt = ΓF (Kt,Xt),
where Γ > 0 and F is a neoclassical production function with the usual properties
(see, e.g., Barro and Sala-´ ı-Martin (2004), pp. 26 - 28). Here, Yt is aggregate out-
put, Γ is meant to capture what Hall and Jones (1999) call social infrastructure, Kt
is capital input in t, and Xt denotes the amount of the intermediate good used in





t , 0 < α < 1. (2.3)
Capital in t must be installed one period before its use in production and, without
loss of generality, fully depreciates after being used. A capital investment of Kt
units undertaken in period t − 1 is ﬁnanced by an issue of (1 + rt)Kt bonds.
In terms of the ﬁnal good of period t as num´ eraire the proﬁt in t of the ﬁnal-good
sector is
Yt − (1 + rt) Kt − pt Xt, (2.4)
4Similar ﬁndings are obtained when I represent the household sector by two-period lived over-
lapping generations with log utility. Since the savings hypothesis of (2.2) avoids expectations over
a possibly inﬁnite horizon to play a role it proves particularly plausible in the presence of growth
stages to which I turn in Section 4.3. I study the case of an endogenous savings rate along the
lines of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) in Section 4.1.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 6
where (1 + rt) Kt is capital service payments and pt Xt is the cost of the intermediate-
good input.
The ﬁnal-good sector takes the sequence {pt,rt} of prices and interest rates as given
and maximizes the sum of the present discounted values of proﬁts in all periods.
Since it simply buys capital and intermediate goods for each period, its maximization
problem is equivalent to a series of one-period maximization problems. Deﬁne the





Using f (kt) ≡ F (kt,1) = kα
t the respective ﬁrst-order conditions for t = 1,2,... are
Kt : αΓk
α−1
t = 1 + rt (2.6)
Xt : (1 − α)Γk
α
t = pt. (2.7)
Initially, the ﬁnal-good sector has K1 units of capital at its disposal. It stems from
investment decisions prior to period t = 1 and causes outstanding debt obligations
equal to (1 + r1)K1.
2.3 The Intermediate-Good Sector
The set of all intermediate-good ﬁrms is represented by the set ℜ+ of nonnegative
real numbers with Lebesgue measure.
2.3.1 Technology
At any date, t, all ﬁrms have access to the same technology with production function
xt = min{1,at hlt}, (2.8)
where xt is output, 1 a capacity limit,5 at the ﬁrm’s labor productivity in period t, hlt
human capital augmented labor input. The index h ≥ 1 reﬂects the Becker-Mincer
5The analysis is easily generalized to allow for an endogenous capacity choice requiring prior
capacity investments, with investment outlays a strictly convex function of capacity. In such
a setting proﬁt-maximizing behavior implies that a large innovation investment is accompanied
by a large capacity investment (see, Hellwig and Irmen (2001) for details). Thus, the simpler
speciﬁcation treated here abstracts from eﬀects on ﬁrm size in an environment with changing
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view that human capital increases the productivity of the labor hours employed by
ﬁrms (Mincer (1974), Becker (1993)). The ﬁrm’s labor productivity is equal to
at = At−1(1 + qt); (2.9)
here At−1 is an economy-wide indicator of the level of technological knowledge ac-
cumulated up to period t − 1, and qt is an indicator of productivity growth at the
ﬁrm.
To achieve a productivity growth rate qt > 0 from period t−1 to period t, the ﬁrm
must invest i(qt,h) units of the ﬁnal good in period t − 1. The function i is time
invariant and satisﬁes for h ≥ 1
i(0,h) = iq(0,h) = 0, iq(q,h) > 0, i,iq → ∞ as q → ∞, iqq > 0 for q ≥ 0, (2.10)
and for q > 0
i(q,h) > 0, ih(q,h) < 0, iqh(q,h) < 0. (2.11)
Hence, a higher rate of productivity growth requires a larger investment, and more
human capital enhances the eﬀect of a given investment volume on productivity
growth. The latter captures the idea enunciated by, e.g., Nelson and Phelps (1966),
Schultz (1975), or Galor and Moav (2000) that human capital is favorable to change,
for instance, because it speeds up the process of learning how to work with a new
technology.6 A functional form that fulﬁlls these conditions is
i(q,h) = q
v h
−z, with 1 < v ≤ 2 and z > 0. (2.12)
It also complies with the following regularity condition that I impose on the convexity











If the ﬁrm innovates the assumption is that an innovation in period t is proprietary
knowledge of the ﬁrm only in t, i.e., in the period when it materializes. Subsequently,
the innovation becomes embodied in the economy-wide productivity indicators At,
At+1,..., with no further scope for proprietary exploitation. The evolution of these
indicators will be speciﬁed below. If ﬁrms decide not to undertake an innovation
investment in period t−1 then, for production in t, they have access to the produc-
tion technique represented by At−1 such that at = At−1. This will matter when we
discuss no-innovation traps in Section 4.3.
6Empirical evidence supporting this idea provide, e.g., Welch (1970) and Bartel and Lichtenberg
(1987).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 8
2.3.2 Proﬁt Maximization and Zero-Proﬁts
To ﬁnance an innovation investment i(qt,h) the ﬁrm issues (1 + rt)i(qt,h) bonds in
period t−1. In period t the government grants a subsidy on such investment equal
to σ (1 + rt)i(qt,h), where σ ∈ (0,1) is the time-invariant subsidy rate. In terms
of the ﬁnal good of period t as num´ eraire, a production plan (qt,lt,xt) for period t
thus yields the proﬁt
πt = pt xt − wt lt − (1 + rt)(1 − σ)i(qt,h), (2.14)
where pt xt = pt min{1, At−1(1 + qt)hlt} is the ﬁrm’s revenue from output sales,
wt lt its wage bill at the real wage rate wt, and (1+rt)(1−σ)i(qt,h) its debt service
net of subsidies.
Competitive ﬁrms take the sequence {pt,wt,rt} of real prices, the sequence {At}
of aggregate productivity indicators, the subsidy rate, σ, and the level of human
capital, h, as given and choose their production plan so as to maximize the sum of
the present discounted values of proﬁts in all periods. Because production choices
for diﬀerent periods are independent of each other, for each period t, they choose
the plan (qt,lt,xt) to maximize the proﬁt πt from this plan in period t.
If the ﬁrm innovates, it incurs an investment cost (1 + rt)(1 − σ)i(qt,h) that is
associated with a given innovation rate qt > 0 and is independent of the output xt.
This introduces a positive scale eﬀect, namely if the ﬁrm innovates, then it wants to
apply the innovation to as large an output as possible and produces at the capacity
limit xt = 1. The choice of (qt,lt) must then minimize the costs of producing the
capacity output.
Suppose wt > 0 and rt > (−1), then an input combination (qt,lt) that minimizes











+ (1 + rt)(1 − σ)i(q,h)
￿
. (2.16)
Given the convexity of the innovation cost function and the fact that iq(0,h) = 0,
(2.16) determines a unique level q∗




= (1 + rt)(1 − σ)iq(q
∗
t,h). (2.17)
The latter relates the marginal reduction of the ﬁrm’s wage bill to the marginal
increase in its investment costs. As both marginal eﬀects are proportional to the
respective factor price, condition (2.17) implies a map q that assigns to each tripleCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 9











Given At−1 the chosen growth rate of labor productivity increases in the relative
factor price ratio, and the properties of the input requirement function i imply that
q (0,h,σ) = 0 and q (∞,h,σ) = ∞. Moreover, q∗
t increases in the subsidy rate
whereas the eﬀect of an increase in the level of human capital has an ambiguous
eﬀect. Indeed, one readily veriﬁes that dq∗
t/dh   0 ⇔ −(∂iq/∂h)h/iq   1. This
condition reﬂects the countervailing eﬀect of the Becker-Mincer versus the Nelson-
Phelps logic on innovation incentives. As a result, we ﬁnd that dq∗
t/dh > 0 obtains
only if the impact of h on the reduction of the marginal investment requirement is
stronger than the disincentive through the labor-augmenting eﬀect of human capital.
This is the case if the elasticity of the marginal investment requirement with respect
to human capital at q∗ is suﬃciently strong. This intuition is conﬁrmed for the
speciﬁcation of i given in (2.12), where dq∗
t/dh > 0 holds if and only if z > 1.
2.4 Consolidating the Production Sector
Turning to implications for the general equilibrium, recall that the set of intermediate-
good ﬁrms is ℜ+ with Lebesgue measure. Therefore, maximum proﬁts that produc-
ing intermediate-good ﬁrms attain in equilibrium for any t must be zero. Indeed,
since the labor supply in each period is bounded, the set of intermediate-good ﬁrms
employing more than some ε > 0 units of labor must have bounded measure and
hence must be smaller than the set of all intermediate-good ﬁrms. Given that in-
active intermediate-good ﬁrms must be maximizing proﬁts just like the active ones,
we need that maximum proﬁts of intermediate-good ﬁrms at equilibrium prices are
equal to zero, i.e.,
πt = π(q
∗
t;pt,wt,rt,At−1,h,σ) = 0. (2.19)
Since all intermediate-good ﬁrms face the same input and output prices, they all
choose the same growth rate of labor productivity, q∗. Moreover, the following
lemma establishes that the conditions for proﬁt-maximization and zero-proﬁts in the
ﬁnal-good and the intermediate-good sector relate this rate of productivity growth
to the capital intensity in the ﬁnal-good sector, k, to the level of human capital, h,
and to the subsidy rate, σ, according to a well-behaved function g (kt,h,σ).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 10
Lemma 1 If (2.6), (2.7), (2.17) and (2.19) hold for all ﬁrms in t, then there is
a map g such that for kt ≥ 0 and h ≥ 1, q∗
t = g (kt,h,σ), with g (0, , ) = 0,
g (∞, , ) = ∞,
gk > 0, gh > 0, and gσ > 0. (2.20)
The fact that gk > 0 can be traced back to the properties of the neoclassical produc-
tion function of the ﬁnal-good sector. They imply that the marginal productivity of
capital falls in kt whereas the marginal productivity of the intermediate good rises.
Accordingly, rt falls and pt rises in kt. Through the zero-proﬁt condition, these price
movements feed back onto the wage, wt, which must also rise. As a result, a higher
kt increases the relative wage in (2.18) and, therewith, the incentives that foster
labor productivity growth. Moreover, the function g captures the eﬀect of human
capital in a changing environment, i.e., as human capital reduces total and marginal
investment outlays, we ﬁnd gh > 0. Similarly, we obtain gσ > 0 since a subsidy rate
reduces marginal investment outlays.
2.5 Evolution of Technological Knowledge
As I set out in the Introduction, the evolution of the economy’s level of technological
knowledge comprises a domestic and a foreign contribution. These channels corre-
spond to the two faces of R&D that Griﬃth, Redding, and Reenen (2004) identify
empirically.
The domestic contribution at t − 1 reﬂects productivity growth achieved at the
level of those domestic intermediate good ﬁrms that produce at t. Denoting the
measure of these ﬁrms by nt, their contribution is equal to the highest level of labor
productivity attained by one of them, i.e.,
max{at(n) = At−1 (1 + q
∗
t(n))|n ∈ [0,nt]}.
Since in equilibrium q∗
t(n) = q∗
t, the domestic contribution boils down to
at = At−1 (1 + q
∗
t). (2.21)
The foreign contribution is an inﬂow of currently unavailable technological knowl-
edge from abroad. It begs the notions of the world’s technological frontier and of a
laggard country. Let Amax
t denote the world’s leading-edge productivity indicator at
t which grows at the constant rate γ > 0, i.e., Amax
t = (1 + γ)Amax
t−1 with Amax
0 > 0
as an initial condition. A country is called a laggard at t if Amax
t > At.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 11
The strength of the foreign contribution at t−1 depends positively on three factors.
First, it relies on the average investment activity of intermediate-good ﬁrms between
t−1 and t, i(q∗
t,h). Second, it hinges on the technological backwardness of the lag-
gard country measured by the gap Amax
t−1 − At−1.7 Third, the country’s openness
to the rest of the world matters. The parameter θ is meant to capture institu-
tional or technological factors that facilitate the inﬂow and implementation of new
knowledge. It may be associated with the presence of restrictions on foreign trade
or migration, to country-speciﬁc barriers to technology adoption as emphasized by
Parente and Prescott (1994), to patent protection of new foreign technologies or to
their appropriateness in the sense of, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) and Basu
and Weil (1998). The economy is said to be open if θ > 0 and closed if θ = 0.






t−1 − At−1). (2.22)
Thus, the second face of R&D measured by i(q∗
t,h) determines the rate of diﬀusion.
This speciﬁcation provides a possible micro-foundation for the assumption intro-
duced by Nelson and Phelps (1966) that the ability of a laggard country to close
the technological gap depends positively on the average level of human capital in
its population. Here, however, the link between the level of human capital and the
strength of the inﬂow is endogenous.
Adding (2.21) to (2.22), we obtain the updating condition for the level of technolog-
ical knowledge to which innovating domestic intermediate-good ﬁrms have access at
t,






t−1 − At−1). (2.23)
This condition is a discrete time analogue of the conﬁned exponential diﬀusion
process studied in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). To see this more clearly, consider















7The representation of technological knowledge by the real line reduces a complicated, multi-
faceted object to a one-dimensional entity. Therefore, one may argue that any domestic innovation
investment of a laggard country creates knowledge that already exists. Then, it is not Amax
t−1 −At−1
that matters as a component of the foreign contribution but rather the gap net of duplication
Amax
t−1 −At−1(1+ q∗
t). It turns out that duplication introduced in this way adds a complication to
the picture that does not aﬀect most of my results. Details for this case are available upon request.
8This may be compared to equation 2.1 in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) where the functions
corresponding to q∗
t and θi(q∗
t,h) are assumed to increase in a country’s level of education and are
not linked to microeconomic magnitudes.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 12
According to Lemma 1, both components of this growth rate are determined in
equilibrium. They will directly depend on the level of human capital and the subsidy
rate, and indirectly on the variables that determine the equilibrium capital intensity
in the ﬁnal-good sector.
Observe that (2.24) can be linked to the idea that economic backwardness facilitates
convergence (see, e.g., Gerschenkron (1962) and Abramovitz (1986)). Indeed, ceteris
paribus, the growth rate of A increases in the gap Amax/A. A backward country may
therefore experience what Gerschenkron called “spurts”, i.e., periods of exceptional
growth rates that even exceed γ.
For further reference we note that the updating condition (2.23) can be expressed
in terms of the laggard country’s relative position with respect to the leading-edge
technology ∆t ≡ At/Amax











3 Intertemporal General Equilibrium
I focus on a laggard country that remains throughout its evolution behind the
leading-edge technology.
3.1 Deﬁnition
I refer to a sequence {pt,wt,rt} as a price system. By an allocation I understand
a sequence {Ct,Lt,Bt,Yt,Kt,Xt,nt,qt,lt,Tt} that comprises a strategy {Ct,Lt,Bt}
for the household sector, a strategy {Yt,Kt,Xt} for the ﬁnal-good sector, a measure
nt of intermediate-good ﬁrms active at t producing the capacity output xt = 1 with
input choices (qt,lt), and the government’s lump-sum tax, Tt.
An equilibrium will correspond to a price system, an allocation, and a sequence
{Πt,At,Amax
t ,∆t} of distributed aggregate proﬁts, indicators for the domestic level
of technological knowledge, for the leading-edge, and the ensuing relative position
∆t that satisfy the following conditions: First, given the initial bond endowment
B1 and the sequence {wt,rt,Πt}, the household sector saves according to (2.2) and
supplies Lt units of labor in all periods. Second, the production sector satisﬁes the
assumptions underlying Lemma 1. Due to constant returns to scale in ﬁnal-good
production, Πt = 0 in all periods. Third, in all periods markets clear. Forth, the
domestic productivity indicator At evolves according to (2.23) and Amax
t grows atCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 13
rate γ > 0. Fifth, the government balances its budget, i.e., Tt = nt σ(1+rt)i(q∗
t,h)
for all t.
In specifying a consistent circular ﬂow of income, one readily veriﬁes that in equi-
librium wt Lt +Bt +Πt −Tt = Yt, i.e., for all periods the household sector’s income
stream is equal to ﬁnal-good production. Accordingly, the equilibrium condition
requiring savings to equal investment is




t for t = 1,2,.... (3.1)
3.2 The Dynamical System
I choose the capital intensity in the ﬁnal-good sector, kt ≡ Kt/Xt, and the relative
position of the domestic technology, ∆t ≡ At/Amax
t , as the state variables of the dy-
namical system. To express (3.1) in terms of k and ∆, note ﬁrst that the equilibrium
in the market for intermediates and full employment in all periods imply
Xt = nt = At−1(1 + q
∗
t)hLt, (3.2)
i.e., aggregate output of the intermediate-good is equal to labor in eﬃciency units.



























(1 + λ). (3.3)
Hence, for an open economy with θ > 0 both the domestic and the foreign contri-
bution matter for the growth of eﬃcient labor.
From (3.1), the ﬁrst equality in (3.2), (3.3), and Lemma 1, we ﬁnd the equation of
motion for kt. Rearranging terms that depend on kt or kt+1 gives










where ˜ s ≡ sΓ/(1 + λ).





1 + g (kt,h,σ) − θi(g (kt,h,σ),h)
1 + γ
∆t−1. (3.5)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 14
An application of the implicit function theorem to (3.4) shows that the latter two
equations constitute a two-dimensional system of ﬁrst-order, autonomous, non-linear
diﬀerence equations. This system may be stated as







for given initial values k1 and ∆0. To assure a trajectory of ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1) for
t = 1,2,... we have to impose constraints on the parameters of the model. The
following lemma makes this more precise.
Lemma 2 There is a unique ¯ k > 0 such that g(¯ k,h,σ) = γ. Let ¯ θ ≡ (1+γ)/i(γ,h).




× (0,1) onto itself if
θ < ¯ θ and ˜ s
1
1−α < ¯ k. (3.7)
Lemma 2 states conditions on parameters such that a country remains behind the
world’s technological frontier throughout its evolution. Intuitively, θ < ¯ θ imposes
an upper bound on the rate of diﬀusion in the updating condition (2.23). If k ≤ ¯ k
then, in equilibrium, domestic innovation incentives are not too strong and g ≤ γ.
Moreover, ˜ s
1
1−α < ¯ k assures that ¯ k is indeed an upper bound on the attainable level
of k through the process of capital accumulation. if not indicated otherwise, I shall
assume henceforth initial values k1 ∈ (0,¯ k) and ∆0 ∈ (0,1) and that the parameters
of the model satisfy the restrictions stated in (3.7).














θi(g (k∗,h,σ),h) + γ − g (k∗,h,σ)
. (3.9)
Proposition 1 states and proves the existence of a unique steady state for a laggard
country. Since the country’s relative position with respect to the leading-edge tech-
nological knowledge, ∆∗, is constant, At grows at rate γ, which is also the growth
rate of all domestic per-capita magnitudes such as income and consumption.
The equation for k∗ is similar to the one of the neoclassical growth model with ex-
ogenous labor-augmenting technical change. The diﬀerence occurs on the left-handCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 15
Figure 1: The Typical Phase Diagram.
Dk = 0








¯ k k∗ 0
The loci Dk = 0 and D∆ = 0 are those where k of ∆ are stationary.
side of (3.8), where the resources necessary to feed domestic innovation investments
are added. With two investment opportunities the role of decreasing returns in the
process of capital accumulation is more pronounced. As a consequence, the level of
k∗ is lower than in a Solow economy with costless exogenous technical change.
The analysis of the local and the global dynamics of the dynamical system is al-
gebraically involved. Figure 1 shows some qualitative features in a typical phase
diagram. Numerical results suggest that the steady state can be locally stable and
a global attractor (see, Appendix 7 for details).
Since the steady-state growth rate is exogenous, comparative statics induce level
eﬀects. To develop an understanding for why steady-state per-capita income diﬀers
across countries we study ﬁrst the eﬀect of parameter changes on k∗.






















Similar to the neoclassical growth model with exogenous technical change, k∗ in-
creases both in s and Γ, i.e., in the investment rate and with a better social in-
frastructure. Moreover, k∗ falls with the steady-state growth rate of labor λ, andCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 16
with the growth rate of the leading-edge productivity indicator γ. These parameters
directly aﬀect the impact of diminishing returns on the accumulation of ﬁnal-good
sector capital.
Moreover, k∗ falls in the subsidy rate. Intuitively, the subsidy rate increases g (k∗,h,σ)
and the equilibrium amount of innovation investments, i(g (k∗,h,σ),h) increases,
too. Accordingly, the level of k∗ has to fall to reestablish the validity of condition
(3.8).
The impact of human capital on k∗ is indeterminate in general. This is the result
of two opposing eﬀects of h on the investment activity of intermediate-good ﬁrms.
On the one hand, more human capital increases the incentive to engage in innova-
tion investments, thus raising the productivity growth rate, g, and the investment
requirements. On the other hand, given g, more human capital lowers investment
requirements. While the former eﬀect alone induces a lower level of k∗, the latter
implies a higher level. I show in the proof of Corollary 1 that the indeterminacy
vanishes if we impose more structure and assume an input requirement function i
with constant elasticity like i = qv h−z of (2.12). Then, the former eﬀect dominates
and dk∗/dh < 0.
Finally, observe that, k∗ is independent of θ. The impact of the evolution of ∆ on
the evolution of k is a transitory phenomenon.
Next, I establish three results related to the steady-state rate of diﬀusion. The ﬁrst
questions the validity of the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis according to which this rate









α − k. (3.12)























< 0 and k
∗ < k
i
max. (3.15)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 17
2) (Growth Policy) It holds that
di(g(k∗,h,σ),h)
dσ
  0 ⇔ k
∗   k
i
max. (3.16)
3) (Domestic Innovation versus Diﬀusion) Consider the steady-state growth rate of

















Statement 1 of Proposition 2 claims that the steady-state rate of diﬀusion may
but need not rise with human capital. Thus, the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis fails in
general. To gain an intuition for this result note that ki
max is the level of the steady-
state capital intensity that maximizes the steady-state rate of diﬀusion. Generically,
the steady state consistent with (3.8) delivers a value k∗  = ki
max. For instance, if
k∗ > ki
max as suggested by (3.14), a higher h that also raises the steady-state rate
of diﬀusion must reduce k∗. According to (3.11) of Corollary 1, such a general
equilibrium eﬀect occurs only if di(g(k∗,h,σ),h)/dh|k=k∗ > 0. If the latter does
not hold, k∗ increases and, contrary to the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis, the steady-
state rate of diﬀusion declines in h. With obvious changes, the same interpretation
applies to the case shown in (3.15).
Statement 2 claims that a rise in the subsidy rate may lower the rate of diﬀusion.
Intuitively, a higher subsidy increases the incentives to innovate. Hence, given k∗
innovation investments increase. Then, however, condition (3.8) requires a smaller
k∗. This general equilibrium eﬀect increases (decreases) the steady-state rate of
diﬀusion if k∗ > ki
max (k∗ < ki
max).
Statement 3 gives the condition under which a country’s share of steady-state pro-
ductivity growth that stems from foreign innovations exceeds the share of produc-
tivity growth due to domestic innovations. According to the estimates of Eaton and
Kortum (1996), all OECD countries but the US satisfy this condition. In view of
Corollary 1, it is straightforward to see that countries with a higher savings rate, a
better social infrastructure, and a lower population growth rate have a higher share
of steady-state productivity growth that derives from domestic innovations. The
presence of partial and general equilibrium eﬀects, possibly of opposite sign, render
the comparative static prediction about the innovation subsidy and human capital
more involved. However, one readily veriﬁes that k∗ > ki
max is suﬃcient for both, σ
and h, to have a positive eﬀect on g.
Next, I turn to the country characteristics that determine ∆∗ of (3.9).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 18









  0 ⇔ k






  0, and
d∆∗
dh




The intuition for these results is straightforward. A higher k∗ increases the growth
rate of labor productivity, g, as well as the investment outlays, i. Therefore, ∆∗ is
higher the higher k∗. Then, from Corollary 1 a larger investment rate, a better social
infrastructure, a lower population growth rate, and a slower pace of the technological
frontier increase ∆∗. Again, because of partial and general equilibrium eﬀects, the
impact of a subsidy and of human capital is in general ambiguous. Finally, a country
with better access to the world’s technological frontier ends up closer to it, i.e., a
higher θ implies a higher ∆∗.
From the ﬁnal-good production function (2.3), Lemma 1, the market-clearing condi-
tion (3.2), the deﬁnition of ∆, and assuming that each worker has one unit of labor













∗ (1 + g(k
∗,h,σ))h. (3.19)
Roughly, ˜ y∗
t consists of three components. First, Γ(k∗)
α, reﬂects the economy’s
overall eﬃciency and the ﬁnal-good production function. The second component,
Amax
t−1 ∆∗ (1 + g(k∗,h,σ)) represents technical change. Third, there is the Becker-
Mincer eﬀect of human capital.
The presence of Amax
t−1 assures growth of ˜ y∗
t at rate γ. The level of ∆∗ determines the
fraction of the leading-edge knowledge at t − 1 that the country is able to absorb
within this period. The presence of the growth factor of domestic labor productivity
recalls the fact that intermediate-good ﬁrms investing in t−1 can build on the level
of knowledge At−1 = Amax
t−1 ∆∗ and that the achieved level of labor productivity
at t is At−1 (1 + g(k∗,h,σ)). Thus, a country’s domestic innovation eﬀort does
not determine its steady-state growth rate but exerts a positive level eﬀect on its
steady-state per-capita income. This is the key diﬀerence between the steady-state
predictions of the present model and the neoclassical growth model with exogenous
technical change.9
9To see this more clearly, replace the intermediate-good sector by the assumption of
exogenous technical change at rate γ, the ﬁnal-good production function (2.3) by Yt =
ΓKα
t (At−1(1 + γ)Lt)
1−α, and set θ = 0. Then, the neoclassical equivalent to (3.19) is ˜ y∗
t =
Γ(k∗)
α At−1(1 + γ)h.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 19
To establish the implications of (3.19) for cross-country income diﬀerences we ﬁrst
note that ˜ y∗ increases in k∗ since ﬁnal-good output, ∆∗, and g increase in k∗. In view
of Corollaries 1 and 2, a prediction is then that countries with a higher investment
rate, a better social infrastructure, and a lower population growth rate have a higher
steady-state per-capita income. Neither the impact of the subsidy nor of human
capital is clear cut. Both magnitudes increase g, however, from Corollaries 1 and 2,
we know that the eﬀect on k∗ and ∆∗ may be negative or positive. Quite intuitively,
an economy that is more open than others is predicted to have a higher per-capita
income since they are able to absorb a larger fraction of the leading-edge technology.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.













4 Extensions and Discussion
4.1 Saving ` a la Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
Consider a closed economy comprising many identical and inﬁnitely lived households.
I normalize the number of households to unity such that individual and aggregate
variables coincide. In each period households supply the same amount of labor,
(1 + λ)t−1, inelastically to the labor market, and, initially, own the same amount of
bonds coming due in t = 1.
Households choose the sequence of consumption and bond holdings per household













t−1, 0 < β (1 + λ) < 1,η > 0, (4.1)
subject to the budget constraint (2.1) and a Ponzi condition, which requires the
present value of a household’s bond holdings to be asymptotically non-negative.10 As
usual, β is the discount factor, and η the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.
With ct ≡ Ct/Xt and the market-clearing condition (3.2), we obtain the Euler
condition for all t = 1,2,...
ct+1 At (1 + g(kt+1,h,σ)) = [β(1 + rt+1)]
1
η ct At−1 (1 + g(kt,h,σ)). (4.2)
10See the Appendix 6.8.2 for details concerning the household’s optimization problem.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 20
Similarly, with bt+1 ≡ Bt+1/Xt+1 and (3.2) the transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
bt+1 At (1 + g(kt+1,h,σ))
￿
1 + λ
1 + ¯ r
￿t
= 0, (4.3)




− 1 is the average real interest rate.
Proposition 4 There is γ > 0 such that a unique balanced growth path for a laggard











and, in view of (3.9), ∆∗
RCK ≡ ∆∗ (k∗
RCK) < 1.
Proposition 4 establishes the existence of a steady-state equilibrium for a laggard
economy. This requires g (k∗
RCK,h,σ) < γ, i.e., k∗
RCK must not be too large. The
proof shows this to be the case if γ is suﬃciently large. As for a constant savings
rate, all per-capita magnitudes grow at the exogenous rate γ.
To understand the implications for the predicted diﬀerences in per-capita income I
ﬁrst note that the eﬀect of preference and technology parameters on k∗
RCK is as in
the neoclassical growth model with exogenous technical change: a higher valuation
of future utility and an increased willingness to accept deviations from a smooth
consumption proﬁle, i.e., a higher β or a lower η, a better infrastructure, i.e., a
higher Γ increase k∗
RCK, and faster growth of the technological frontier accentuates
the role of diminishing returns and leads to a lower k∗
RCK.
Observe that neither the growth rate of the labor force, λ, nor human capital, h,
or the subsidy, σ, aﬀect k∗
RCK. This reﬂects the fact that here consumption growth
is pegged to intertemporal prices rather than the result of a market equilibrium
condition. This has direct implications both for the validity of the Nelson-Phelps
hypothesis.
Proposition 5 Consider the steady state characterized in Proposition 4.









> 0. (4.6)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 21
3) (Domestic Innovation versus Diﬀusion) Technology diﬀusion is the more impor-
tant source of steady-state technological progress, i.e., g < γ/2, in countries with a
small h and/or a small σ.
Absent of general equilibrium eﬀects, the rate of diﬀusion increases if i increases in
h or for a higher subsidy. Similarly, the condition g < γ/2 is easier satisﬁed the
smaller h and/or σ. Next, we turn to the comparative statics of ∆∗
RCK.




























Compared to Corollary 2 the elimination of general equilibrium eﬀects gives rise to
three diﬀerences. First, the impact of a subsidy is unequivocal. An increase in σ
raises ∆∗
RCK since domestic innovation incentives become more pronounced and, as
a consequence, the rate of diﬀusion rises. Second, human capital raises ∆∗
RCK if it
raises the rate of diﬀusion such that the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis holds at k∗
RCK.
Moreover, ∆∗
RCK becomes independent of population growth. These ﬁndings have
implications for the steady-state level of per-capita income, which is still given by
(3.19).





























The comparison with Proposition 3 reveals that the eﬀect of σ and h is positive if
these parameters have a positive impact on ∆∗
RCK. Moreover, the level of steady-
state per-capita income is independent of population growth.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 22
4.2 The Closed Economy and Club Convergence
Consider a laggard economy as described in Sections 2 and 3 that is cut oﬀ from
the evolution of the world’s technological frontier. Then, θ = 0 and the evolution of
k is independent of ∆. The equations of motion for these variables, (3.4) and (3.5),
become





1 + g (kt,h,σ)
1 + γ
∆c,t−1. (4.12)





for all q > 0 . (4.13)
Again, a functional form that fulﬁlls this condition is i = qv h−z, 1 < v ≤ 2.
Proposition 7 Let (˜ s)
1/(1−α) < ¯ k and assume that (4.13) holds. For any initial
value k1 ∈ (0,¯ k), the evolution of kt according to (4.11) gives rise to a unique,
globally stable steady state, k∗


























The intuition behind Proposition 7 can be learned from Figure 2, which depicts
the right-hand side, ˜ s(kt)α, and the left-hand side, LHS(kt+1), of (4.11). Condition
(4.13) assures that the left-hand side is a convex function in kt+1. Thus, there is a
unique and globally stable steady state, k∗
c > 0. The steady-state growth rate of all
per-capita magnitudes must be smaller than γ since k∗
c < ¯ k. As a consequence, ∆c,t
declines at a constant rate and the distance to the technological frontier becomes
larger over time. The latter result obtains in spite of the fact that the domestic
steady-state innovation activity in the closed economy is greater than in the openCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 23
Figure 2: The Evolution of k in the Closed Economy.
kt,kt+1,k∗







Here, LHS (kt+1) ≡ (1 + g(kt+1,h,σ))(kt+1 + i(g(kt+1,h,σ),h)) of equation (4.11).
economy. To see why, I multiply the steady-state condition (3.8) by 1 + γ and
show the left-hand side of the resulting equation in Figure 2. Since γ > g, we have
k∗ < k∗
c.
Steady-state per-capita income in the closed economy is ˜ y∗
c,t = Γ(k∗
c)
α At−1 (1 +
g(k∗
c,h,σ))h. It grows at rate g(k∗
c,h,σ) such that changes in country character-
istics generate level and growth eﬀects. Nevertheless, an implication of the global
stability is that a country starting at k∗ converges to k∗
c following a cut-oﬀ from
the technological frontier. As a consequence, the growth rate of per-capita income
declines below γ and the country falls behind forever. This mechanism suggests
that China’s self-imposed isolationism in the 15th century AD is a cause for the
subsequent relative decline of its economy.












  0 ⇔ −gh (k
∗










  0. (4.18)
The qualitative predictions of Corollary 3 mimic those for the open economy (see,
Corollary 1). The eﬀects of s, Γ, λ, and σ are of the same sign. The eﬀect of h is
indeterminate in general. However, due to the direct eﬀect of h on g, which appears
in (4.18), it is more likely to be negative. Intuitively, a rise in g increases nextCross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 24
period’s amount of eﬃcient labor and, therefore, the amount of ﬁnal-good capital
necessary to keep k constant. Hence, capital accumulation grinds to a halt at a
lower level of k∗
c. Denote k∗
c ≡ k∗
c (˜ s,σ,h) the function resulting from Corollary 3.
Proposition 8 The steady-state growth rate of the closed economy is
q
∗
c = g (k
∗
























Hence, steady-state growth rates diﬀer across closed economies and reﬂect country
characteristics. A higher investment rate, a better social infrastructure, and a lower
population growth rate raise the steady-state growth rate of the economy. The
eﬀects of the subsidy rate and of human capital involve partial and general equi-
librium eﬀects of opposite sign. Low values of the subsidy rate weaken the general
equilibrium eﬀect such that both h and σ raise the steady-state growth rate of the
closed economy. Since over time level eﬀects are dominated by growth eﬀects, these
comparative statics also determine ˜ y∗
c,t. In a world with closed and open economies,
club convergence in growth rates occurs among open economies that eventually grow
at rate γ and groups of closed economies with country characteristics such that q∗
c
is the same.
4.3 No-Innovation Traps and Club Convergence
In many countries proﬁt-maximizing agents do not undertake innovation invest-
ments. When technology transfer is a byproduct of domestic innovation activities,
these open economies do not beneﬁt from foreign innovations. Club convergence
results with some countries approaching a stationary steady state.11
Unproﬁtability of innovation investments arises if investment requirements are too
high. Suppose that iq(0,h) > 0, i.e., the ﬁrst marginal unit of q is no longer
costless. Without loss of generality as to the upcoming qualitative results, we rely
on the functional form of i as given in (2.12) with v = 1 such that iq(0,h) = h−z > 0.
11The analysis of this section complements and extends the analysis in Irmen (2005).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 25
An immediate implication is that the equilibrium does not necessarily involve q∗
t > 0.
To see this consider the ﬁrst-order condition (2.17). Since iq(0,h) > 0, there are
parameter constellations such that
wt
At−1 h
≤ (1 + rt)(1 − σ)iq(0,h), (4.21)
and the cost-minimizing choice is q∗
t = 0. It follows that the consolidated production















Consequently, an equilibrium at t + 1 involves g > 0 if and only if
kt+1 > h
−z (1 − σ)
α
1 − α
≡ ˆ k, (4.23)
and g = 0 otherwise. Intuitively, if at t intermediate-good ﬁrms expect kt+1 < ˆ k,
then they expect an equilibrium factor price ratio wt+1/(1+rt+1) too small to justify
an investment in labor-saving technical change. Without an investment at t, ﬁrms
produce in t + 1 with the technology of period t. Moreover, there is no technology
transfer between period t and t+1 either, and the updating condition (2.23) simpliﬁes
to At+1 = At. Then, the equations of motion (3.4) and (3.5) for kt and ∆t become








Next, we determine the conditions under which intermediate-good ﬁrms innovate.
From (4.23), an equilibrium at t+1 without innovation ceases to exist if and only if
kt+1 = ˜ sk
α






≡ ˆ k. (4.26)
It is replaced by an equilibrium with innovation. Indeed, the equation of motion for
k at t takes innovation investments into account and becomes
(1 + g(kt+1,h,σ))(kt+1 + i(g(kt+1,h,σ),h)) = ˜ sk
α
t . (4.27)
The equilibrium with innovation exists and is unique since the left-hand side of
(4.27) satisﬁes LHS(ˆ k) = kt+1 and LHS′(kt+1) > 0.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 26
The evolution of k between t and t+1 as given in (4.27) is not aﬀected by an inﬂow
of technological knowledge from abroad since such inﬂow requires previous domestic
innovation investments. Only ﬁrms that innovate at t+1 beneﬁt from the inﬂow of
foreign knowledge. Thus, the evolution of k between periods t+1 and t+2 is again
governed by equation (3.4).12
The following Proposition shows what country characteristics determine whether an
evolution that is initially driven by capital accumulation alone leads to domestic
innovation and an inﬂow of technological knowledge from abroad.
Proposition 9 Let k1 < ˆ k such that the economy experiences at least one period
without innovation investments.
1. If ˜ s
1
1−α ≤ ˆ k, then the economy evolves without innovation and converges to-
wards a stationary steady state with k∗ = ˜ s
1
1−α. At any time, the country’s
relative position with respect to the leading-edge technology declines at rate
γ/(1 + γ).
2. If ¯ k > ˜ s
1
1−α > ˆ k, then the economy reaches a level of k in ﬁnite time and
switches into a regime with domestic innovation in the following period. The
innovation regime has a unique steady state (k∗,∆∗) given by (3.8) and (3.9).
Proposition 9 emphasizes that economies starting out with the same initial con-
ditions may evolve in quite diﬀerent ways. Using Statement 2 and the deﬁnition
of ˆ k we obtain the requirement for economies to reach the regime with domestic












This condition is more likely to be fulﬁlled the more thrifty the economy is, the lower
its growth rate of the labor force, the better its social infrastructure, the higher its
level of human capital, and the higher the subsidy rate for innovation investments.
12The evolution of the economy may well involve cycles since the inﬂow of technological knowl-
edge in t + 1 necessarily reduces the capital intensity kt+2. If this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong,
ﬁrms in t + 1 rationally expect kt+2 ≤ ˆ k and no innovation investment occurs. However, if the
condition stated in Proposition 9 is fulﬁlled, such economy must again reach a period with a regime
switch as characterized above. Calibration exercises show that there are paths that converge from
the stationary regime to the steady state of Proposition 1. The complete characterization of the
dynamics involved is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 27
Solving (4.28) for h gives a minimum requirement of human capital for innovation
and catch-up with the technological frontier. This is consistent the empirical ﬁndings
of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).13
Hence, the world income distribution may exhibit club convergence with some coun-
tries trapped in a stationary steady state while others experience steady growth.
5 Concluding Remarks
Arguably, the diﬀerential evolution of productivity across countries is the main force
behind cross-country income diﬀerences. To understand these income diﬀerences one
must understand what causes productivity growth. I take the view that productivity
growth is due to the growth of a country’s level of accessible technological knowledge.
In turn, growth of this knowledge is the result of the interaction between a domestic
and a foreign contribution via technology transfer. I show that the magnitudes that
aﬀect this interaction also account for steady-state cross-country income diﬀerences.
The analysis suggests several routes for future research. First, one may want to
generalize the diﬀusion process and separate institutional from technological factors
that foster technology diﬀusion. To accomplish this, I rely on a variant of a logistic
process for which Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) ﬁnd evidence. Preliminary results
suggest the emergence of multiple steady states in the basic model, thus allowing
for club convergence.
Second, one may argue that the degree of openness is not constant over time. On the
one hand, historical evidence suggests waves of globalization that are correlated with
rapid growth of the world economy (O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), Helpman
(2004)). On the other hand, technical progress per se is likely to have increased
the rate of diﬀusion. Finally, one may want to endogenize the growth rate of the
world’s technological frontier, to account for possible feedback eﬀects from worldwide
innovation eﬀorts to the evolution of domestic productivity.
13The role of skill levels for the occurrence of club convergence is also stressed in Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 28
6 Appendix I: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, suppress time subscripts.
Zero-proﬁt implies w = A−1 (1 + q∗)h[p − (1 + r)(1 − σ)i(q∗,h)]. With (2.6) and (2.7), this can
be written as
w
A−1 h(1 + r)




k − (1 − σ)i(q∗,h)
￿
.
Using the latter in (2.17), we obtain
1 − α
α
k = (1 − σ) ((1 + q∗)iq(q∗,h) + i(q∗,h)). (6.1)
The derivatives stated in (2.20) follow from the implicit function theorem applied to (6.1) and the





(1 − σ)(2iq + (1 + g)iqq)
> 0, (6.2)
gh = −
(1 + g)iqh + ih
2iq + (1 + g)iqq
> 0, (6.3)
gσ =
(1 + g)iq + i
(1 − σ)(2iq + (1 + g)iqq)
> 0, (6.4)
where the argument of g is (k,h,σ), and the argument of i is (g,h).  
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The existence of a unique ¯ k follows from the properties of the function g(k,h,σ), which satisﬁes
g(0,h,σ) = 0, g(∞,h,σ) = ∞, and gk(k,h,σ) > 0 for all k > 0 (see Lemma 1).
The remaining part of the proof of Lemma 2 proceeds with the statement and proof of four claims.
Claim 1 There is a unique ¯ ¯ k > 0 that solves
θi(g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ),h) = 1 + γ. (6.5)
Moreover, there is a function
¯ ¯ k = ¯ ¯ k(θ), with ¯ ¯ k′(θ) < 0, limθ→0 ¯ ¯ k(θ) = ∞, limθ→∞ ¯ ¯ k(θ) = 0. (6.6)
Proof of Claim 1 The existence of ¯ ¯ k > 0 follows from the properties of the function g and those
of the function i as stated in (2.10). An application of the implicit function theorem to (6.5) reveals
that there is a function ¯ ¯ k = ¯ ¯ k(θ), with ¯ ¯ k′(θ) < 0. To study its asymptotic properties write (6.5)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 29
as i(g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ),h) = (1 + γ)/θ. Since i → ∞ as q → ∞ and g → ∞ as k → ∞, it follows that
limθ→0 ¯ ¯ k(θ) = ∞. Since i(0,h) = 0 and g(0,h,σ) = 0, it follows that limθ→∞ ¯ ¯ k(θ) = 0.  
Claim 2 There is ¯ θ ≡ (1 + γ)/i(γ,h) that solves ¯ ¯ k(¯ θ) = ¯ k. Then
¯ ¯ k   ¯ k ⇔ θ ⋚ ¯ θ. (6.7)
Proof of Claim 2 The existence of a unique value ¯ θ and inequality (6.7) follow from the properties
of the function ¯ ¯ k(θ) as set out in Claim 1. By construction, ¯ θ satisﬁes ¯ θi(g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ),h) = 1 +
g(¯ k,h,σ) = 1 + γ. Hence, ¯ θ = (1 + γ)/i(γ,h).  
Claim 3 The function φ∆ (kt,∆t−1) maps ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1) onto itself if and only if θ < ¯ θ and
kt ∈ [0,¯ k].
Proof of Claim 3 From (3.5) it is obvious that a trajectory with ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1) for all t ≥ 1





1 + g(k,h,σ) − θi(g(k,h,σ),h)
1 + γ
∆t−1 > 0. (6.8)
The following cases must be distinguished:
• θ < ¯ θ, thus ¯ ¯ k > ¯ k:
– if k ∈ [0,¯ k] and 1 + g(k,h,σ) − θi(g(k,h,σ),h) > 0, then from the deﬁnition of
¯ k both the left-hand inequality and the right-hand inequality of (6.8) hold for all
∆t−1 ∈ (0,1).
To see that k ∈ [0,¯ k] is necessary consider values k > ¯ k. Since ¯ ¯ k > ¯ k, there is a
bound, ¯ ∆ ∈ (0,1), for all k ∈ (¯ k,¯ ¯ k) such that the left-hand inequality is only satisﬁed
for ∆t−1 < ¯ ∆. To compute ¯ ∆, solve the left-hand inequality of (6.8) for ∆t−1. This
gives
∆t−1 <
1 + γ − θi(g(k,h,σ),h)
1 + g(k,h,σ) − θi(g (k,h,σ),h)
≡ ¯ ∆. (6.9)
Clearly, ¯ ∆ ∈ (0,1) as long as 1 + γ − θi(g (k,h,σ),h) > 0, ∂ ¯ ∆/∂k < 0, and ¯ ∆ = 0
for k = ¯ ¯ k. Hence, for k ∈ (¯ k,¯ ¯ k) only values of ∆t−1 that satisfy ∆t−1 < ¯ ∆ imply
∆t ∈ (0,1). The set of admissible values for ∆t−1 is therefore smaller than the set
(0,1). For k ≥ ¯ ¯ k, it is empty. Hence, for 1 + g(k,h,σ) − θi(g(k,h,σ),h) > 0 Claim 3
holds.
– The case 1+g(k,h,σ)−θi(g(k,h,σ),h) ≤ 0 can only arise if there is k = ˜ k < ∞ that
satisﬁes the latter inequality as an equality. However, since ¯ ¯ k > ¯ k and 1+g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ)−
θi(g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ),h) > 0 it follows that ˜ k > ¯ ¯ k. In turn, from Claim 1, it follows for k > ¯ ¯ k
that θi(g(k,h,σ),h) > 1 + γ. Hence, there is no ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes the
left-hand inequality of (6.8). Hence, if k ∈ [0,¯ k], this case cannot arise.
• θ > ¯ θ, thus ¯ ¯ k < ¯ k:
– The inequality 1 + g(k,h,σ) − θi(g(k,h,σ),h) > 0 requires k ∈ (0,˜ k). Since ˜ k < ¯ ¯ k
both the left-hand and the right-hand inequality of (6.8) hold for all k ∈ [0,˜ k] and
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– Consider 1 + g(k,h,σ) − θi(g(k,h,σ),h) ≤ 0, which requires k ≥ ˜ k. Then, the left-
hand side inequality of (6.8) is satisﬁed for all ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1) as long as k ∈ (˜ k,¯ ¯ k). For
k ≥ ¯ ¯ k, ¯ ∆ serves as a lower bound such that the left-hand inequality of (6.8) is satisﬁed
whenever ∆t−1 > ¯ ∆. As ∂ ¯ ∆/∂k > 0 and ¯ ∆ = 1 for k = ¯ k, there is no ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1)
that satisﬁes this inequality for k ≥ ¯ k. Hence, there is k ∈ [0,¯ k] and ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1)
such that (6.8) cannot be satisﬁed.
• θ = ¯ θ, thus ¯ ¯ k = ¯ k:
This constellation violates the left-hand inequality of (6.8) since 1+g(¯ k,h,σ)−θi(g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ),h) =
0 and ¯ θi(g(¯ ¯ k,h,σ),h)/(1 + γ) = 1.  




× (0,1) onto itself if the conditions in (3.7) hold.




and ∆t−1 ∈ (0,1).
From (3.4), φk(k,∆t−1) ≥ 0 is trivially satisﬁed, however ¯ k ≥ φk(k,∆t−1) may not. To make sure
that the latter holds, we ﬁrst note that the left-hand side of (3.4) is increasing in kt+1. Hence,
φk(¯ k,1) = ˜ s¯ kα is an upper bound on kt+1 since the right-hand side of (3.4) increases in ∆t−1 and
kt. Moreover, since the slope of the left-hand side of (3.4) with respect to kt+1 is strictly greater
than one, a suﬃcient condition for kt+1 ≤ ¯ k is ˜ s¯ kα < ¯ k, or (˜ s)
1/(1−α) < ¯ k. Then, Claim 4 follows
from Claim 3.  
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Set ∆t = ∆t−1 = ∆∗ and kt = k∗ ∈ (0,¯ k) in (3.5) and obtain (3.9). Using kt = kt−1 = k∗ and (3.9)
in (3.4) gives (3.8). It remains to be shown that (3.8) gives rise to a unique solution k∗ ∈ (0,¯ k).
First, I show that (3.8) has a unique solution k∗ > 0. Deﬁne a function LHS(k) ≡ k +
i(g(k,h,σ),h). The properties of the functions g and i (see Lemma 1, (2.10), and (2.13)) im-
ply that LHS(k) is continuous in k with LHS(0) = 0 + i(g(0,h,σ),h) = 0, LHS′(k) = 1 +
iq(g(k,h,σ),h)gk(k,h,σ) > 1 for k > 0, and limk→0 LHS′(k) = 1. Moreover, LHS′′(k) =
iqq(g(k,h,σ),h)g2
k(k,h,σ)+iq(g(k,h,σ),h)gkk(k,h,σ) > 0 for k > 0 since (2.13) holds. To verify
this, we start from (6.2) and ﬁnd for k > 0 that
gkk = −g2
k
3iqq + (1 + g)iqqq
2iq + (1 + g)iqq
, (6.10)
where the argument of g is (k,h,σ), and the argument of i is (g,h). Then,
LHS








In view of (6.10) this comes down to
LHS




3iqq + (1 + g)iqqq
2iq + (1 + g)iqq
> 0. (6.12)
The latter inequality is satisﬁed whenever the regularity requirement (2.13) holds.
Deﬁne RHS(k) ≡ ˜ skα/(1+γ). This function satisﬁes RHS(0) = 0 and RHS′(k) > 0 for all k ≥ 0
with RHS′(0) = ∞ and limk→∞ RHS′(k) = 0. Hence, there is one and only one strictly positive
value k∗ that satisﬁes LHS(k∗) = RHS(k∗).
To see that the the intersection LHS(k∗) = RHS(k∗) occurs for some k < ¯ k recall from Lemma 2
that ¯ k is independent of ˜ s. Moreover, RHS(k) becomes arbitrarily small as ˜ s → 0. Hence, there
are parameter constellations, (θ,γ,h,σ,α) such that k∗ ∈ (0,¯ k).  Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 31
6.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Consider the total diﬀerential of (3.8)
0 =
￿

















In equation (6.13) the ﬁrst term in brackets is positive. To see this recall the functions LHS(k)
and RHS(k) as deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1. Obviously, the term is brackets corresponds
to LHS′(k) − RHS′(k). The proof of Proposition 1 implies that the function LHS(k) intersects
the function RHS(k) from below at k∗. Therefore, we must have LHS(k∗) > RHS(k∗).
The comparative statics stated in (3.10) and (3.11) follow from the deﬁnition of ˜ s and the properties
of the functions i and g as stated in (2.10), (2.11), and Lemma 1.























Using the latter and Lemma 1, we have
gh = −
(1 + g)iqh + ih
2iq + (1 + g)iqq
=
(1 + g)εiq,h + i
iq εi,h
























  1 ⇔ 0   1. (6.15)
Hence, −(iq gh + ih) < 0 and dk∗/dh < 0.  
6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
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+ iqgh + ih   0. (6.17)





1 + iq gk − ˜ s α
1+γ (k∗)
α−1, (6.18)
where the denominator is strictly positive. Therefore, inequality (6.17) is equivalent to
di(g (k∗,h,σ),h)
dh








  0. (6.19)
Hence, di(.)/dh > 0 if either (3.14) or (3.15) hold.






+ iqgσ   0. (6.20)





1 + iq gk − ˜ s α
1+γ (k∗)
α−1. (6.21)
Then, inequality (6.20) is equivalent to
di(g (k∗,h,σ),h)
dσ




α−1   0. (6.22)
Hence, (3.16) follows.
Statement 3 follows from (2.24), steady-state condition (3.9), and the fact that in the steady state
At/At−1 − 1 = γ.  
6.6 Proof of Corollary 2













θiq gk(γ − g) + gk θ i
(θi + γ − g)
2 > 0 (6.24)
the ﬁrst result of (3.18) follows from Corollary 1.
The total eﬀect of a change of γ involves a direct and an indirect eﬀect. Starting with the eﬀect


















since dk∗/dγ < 0 (see Corollary 1).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 33





θiqgσ (γ − g) + θigσ
(θi + γ − g)












  0. (6.27)
Since dk∗/dσ < 0 (Corollary 1), the sign of d∆∗/dσ is indeterminate. However, using (6.24),
(6.26), and (6.13) one veriﬁes that inequality (6.27) is equivalent to
d∆∗
dσ





α−1   0. (6.28)
Then, (3.18) follows with the proof of Proposition 2.




θ(iq gh + ih)(γ − g) + θigh












  0. (6.30)
Using (6.29), (6.24), (3.8), we ﬁnd that
d∆∗
dh








[(iq gh + ih)(γ − g) + igh]   ih gk i (6.31)
Assume iq gh + ih > 0 and k∗ > ki






(θ i + γ − g)2 > 0. (6.32)
 
6.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Denote k∗ = k∗(s,Γ,λ,γ,σ,h) and ∆∗ = ∆∗(k∗,σ,h,γ,θ) the functions deﬁned by Corollary 1 and
2 and recall q∗ = g (k∗,h,σ). Given Amax
−1 we have per-capita income of the next period as
˜ y


















∂k∗ > 0. (6.34)












































































  0. (6.38)
These two comparative statics involve terms of opposite sign such that the sum cannot be signed









which proves the remaining terms in (3.20).  
6.8 Proposition 4
This section comprises three parts. Subsection 6.8.1 has the details concerning the representative
household’s optimization problem. Subsection 6.8.2 has the proof of Proposition 4. Section ??
proves the property of the steady-state savings rate stated in the main text.
6.8.1 The Problem of the Representative Household











, 0 < β (1 + λ) < 1,η > 0, (6.40)
subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
˜ ct +˜ bt+1
1 + λ
1 + rt+1
≤ wt +˜ bt − ˜ τt, t = 1,2,... (6.41)






1 + ¯ r
￿t
≥ 0, (6.42)




−1 is the average real interest rate. In (6.41) we use the fact that
dividends are zero in equilibrium, i.e., ˜ πt = 0. Since lim˜ c→0 (˜ c)
−η = ∞, the ﬂow budget constraint
is binding at all t, and optimal plan involves ˜ c > 0 at all t.










(1 + λ)t−1 +  t
￿
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and the following ﬁrst-order conditions
(β (1 + λ))
t−1 (˜ ct)




+ β  t+1 = 0, t = 1,2,... (6.44)
wt +˜ bt − ˜ τt − ˜ ct −˜ bt+1
1 + λ
1 + rt+1








From (6.43) and (6.44), we obtain the Euler condition
˜ ct+1 = [β (1 + rt+1)]
1
η ˜ ct. (6.47)
To express the latter in terms of eﬃcient labor we use the deﬁnition ct ≡ Ct/Xt = ˜ ct+1 Lt/Xt and
the market-clearing condition (3.2). This gives (4.2).
Condition (6.44) implies the following evolution of the multiplier  t,






j=1 (1 + rj+1)
, t = 2,3,.... (6.48)

























1 + ¯ r
￿t
˜ bt+1, (6.49)
where the last step uses (6.43) to conclude that  1 > 0 and the deﬁnition of ¯ r. Invoking the
deﬁnition bt+1 ≡ Bt+1/Xt+1 = ˜ bt+1 Lt+1/Xt+1 and the market-clearing condition (3.2) gives (4.3).
6.8.2 Proof of Proposition 4
To describe the evolution of the economy we use, as before, kt and ∆t−1 as the state variables of
the dynamical system. Since aggregate consumption equals output minus investment, we obtain
with Lemma 1 and the equilibrium conditions (3.2)
ct = Γkα





(kt+1 + i(g(kt+1,h,σ),h)). (6.50)
In equilibrium rt+1 is a function of kt+1 (see condition (2.6)) and, from (2.23), the growth factor
At/At−1 is a function of kt and ∆t−1. Therefore, the Euler condition becomes a diﬀerence equation
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The bond market equilibrium assures that bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)(kt+1 + i(g(kt+1,h,σ),h)) for all
t = 1,2,.... Invoking (2.6) and the deﬁnition At ≡ ∆t Amax
t , the transversality condition can be
expressed in terms of the state variables of the system. As a result, the dynamical system comprises
the Euler condition, the equation of motion for ∆ as stated in (3.5), initial values k1, ∆0, and ∆1,
and the transversality condition.14
In the steady state all magnitudes in eﬃciency units are constant, i.e., ct+1 = ct = c and kt+1 =












Since At/At−1 = 1 + γ, the ﬁnding (4.4) of Proposition 4 is immediate.
Next we have to show that k∗
RCK can be part of an equilibrium allocation of a laggard country.
First, consider the transversality condition. Since ˜ bt+1 ≡ At+1 bt+1 > 0, (6.49) at the steady state

















where the last step uses uses (4.4). To satisfy (6.52) we need
β(1 + λ) < (1 + γ)η−1. (6.53)
Since β(1 + λ) < 1, the latter condition is only binding if 0 < η < 1. In this case, it is satisﬁed
whenever
γ < [β(1 + λ)]
−1
1−η − 1 ≡ ¯ γ. (6.54)
Second, we have to make sure that k∗
RCK < ¯ k. This requirement imposes a lower bound on γ.
Consider the function k∗
RCK(γ) ≡ [αβ Γ/(1 + γ)
η]
1/(1−α). It satisﬁes





< 0, and lim
γ→∞
k∗(γ) = 0. (6.55)
Next, consider the properties of the function g and g(¯ k,h,σ) = γ. The latter equation implicitly
deﬁnes a function ¯ k(γ) with the following properties






> 0, and lim
γ→∞
¯ k(γ) > 0. (6.56)
Hence, the functions k∗
RCK(γ) and ¯ k(γ) intersect once and only once at some γ > 0. Let k∗
RCK(γ) =
¯ k(γ). Then it holds that
k∗
RCK(γ) < ¯ k(γ) ⇔ γ > γ. (6.57)
Accordingly, if η ≥ 1 the balanced growth path exists for any γ > γ, if η ∈ (0,1) it exists for any
γ ∈ (γ, ¯ γ) . There are parameter constellations, (β,λ,η) such that (γ, ¯ γ) is non-empty.  
14In fact, given k1 and ∆0, ∆1 is fully determined by (3.5).Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 37
6.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 follows immediately from Lemma 1, the deﬁnition of the rate of diﬀusion, and the
observation that k∗
RCK is independent of h and σ.  
6.10 Proof of Corollary 3
A change in one of the parameters j = β,η,Γ aﬀects ∆∗













, j = β,ǫ,Γ. (6.58)
From Corollary 2, we know that d∆∗
RCK/dk∗
RCK > 0. Hence, the ﬁrst three results of (4.7) follow
immediately from (4.4).
The eﬀect of a change of γ involves a direct and an indirect eﬀect through k∗
RCK. From (4.4)
and Corollary 2 both are negative. The parameters σ, h, and θ induce eﬀects that are given in
equations (6.26), (6.29), and (6.32) in the proof of Corollary 2.  
6.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Denote k∗
RCK = k∗
RCK(β,η,Γ,γ) the function deﬁned by the steady state (4.4), ∆∗ = ∆∗(k∗
RCK,σ,h,γ,θ)
the function deﬁned by Corollary 3, and recall q∗ = g(k∗
RCK,h,σ). Given Amax
−1 we have per-capita
income of the next period as
˜ y
∗

















for the same reason as in equation (6.34) in the proof of Proposition 3. Then, the ﬁrst three results
stated in (4.9) result from (6.60) and the properties of the function k∗
RCK(.). The comparative
static with respect to γ follows from the analogue of equation (6.36).

































  0. (6.62)
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6.12 Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the left-hand side of (4.14) and deﬁne
LHS(k) ≡ (1 + g(k,h,σ))(k + i(g(k,h,σ),h)).
The properties of the functions g and i (see Lemma 1, (2.10), and (2.13)) imply that LHS(k)
is a continuous function with LHS(0) = 0, LHS′(k) = gk (k + i(g,h)) + (1 + g)(1 + iqgk) > 1






> 0 for k > 0 if condition (4.13) is satisﬁed. To verify the latter, recall from the
proof of Proposition 1 that (2.13) implies iqqg2
k + iqgkk > 0 for k > 0. As I show below, condition
(4.13) is suﬃcient for LHS′′(k) > 0 and k > 0 since it assures that gkk(k + i) +2gk (1 + iqgk) ≥ 0




3iqq + (1 + g)iqqq
2iq + (1 + g)iqq
(k + i). (6.64)




3iqq + (1 + g)iqqq
2iq + (1 + g)iqq
. (6.65)






(k + i). (6.66)
Next, we use (6.2) and the fact that (6.1) relates k to i, α, and σ. We obtain successively
2(1 − σ)α
1 − α






































Since iq > 0 whenever q > 0, the latter is satisﬁed if 2i2
q ≥ iiqq, which coincides with (4.13).
The right-hand side of (4.14) deﬁnes RHS(k) ≡ ˜ skα, a strictly concave function with RHS(0) = 0,
RHS′(0) = ∞, and RHS′(∞) = 0. Hence, there is one and only one value k∗
c > 0 that satisﬁes
LHS(k∗
c) = RHS(k∗
c).15 A simple graphical argument shows that any sequence {kt} that starts
below or above k∗
c converges monotonically.
15If LHS(k) is not convex on k ∈ (0,¯ k) there may be multiple steady states. To see this observe
that RHS′(k) = 1 at k = (α˜ s)
1/(1−α). If the functions LHS(k) and RHS(k) intersect for the ﬁrst
time at some k∗
c ≥ (α˜ s)
1/(1−α), then, since LHS′(k) > 1, the steady state is unique and globally
stable. If the functions RHS(k) and LHS(k) intersect for the ﬁrst time at some k∗
c < (α˜ s)
1/(1−α),
they may intersect more than once if LHS(k) is concave with suﬃcient curvature. In any case,
the argument that proves the existence of a unique k∗
c > 0 implies that the total number of steady
states must be odd. Moreover, the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth,... intersection of RHS(k) and LHS(k) is
locally stable since it satisﬁes RHS′(k∗
c) < LHS′(k∗
c). Those associated with an even number
must be locally unstable.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 39
Since, (˜ s)
1/(1−α) is the steady state if LHS′(k) = 1 for all k, we have k∗
c < (˜ s)
1/(1−α) < ¯ k. Hence,
g(k∗
c,h,σ) < γ and (4.16) holds. Moreover, a comparison of (4.14) with (3.8) reveals readily the
validity of result (4.15). Result (4.16) is immediate from (4.12).
 
6.13 Proof of Corollary 4












c + i) + (1 + g)(iq gh + ih)]dh
+ [gσ (k∗




α d˜ s, (6.68)
where the argument of i is (g,h) and the argument of g is (k∗
c,h,σ).
The ﬁrst term in brackets is positive since, at k∗
c, the slope of the left-hand side of (4.14) is greater
than the slope of the right-hand side.
The comparative statics stated in (4.17) and (4.18) follow from (6.68), the deﬁnition of ˜ s, the
properties of the functions i and g as stated in (2.10), (2.11), and Lemma 1. Moreover, the result
for i = qv h−z follows from gh > 0 and Corollary 1.  
6.14 Proof of Proposition 8
Throughout this proof the argument of g is (k∗
c,h,σ) and the argument of i is (g,h).
The parameters j = s,Γ,λ aﬀect q∗










The signs given in (4.20) follow directly from gk > 0 and Corollary 3. As to the the comparative








+ gj, j = σ,h. (6.69)
In view of Corollary 3 and the properties of the function g, these eﬀects may be of opposite sign.






c + i) + (1 + g)iq gσ
gk (k∗







c + i + (1 + g)iq
k∗
c + i +
1+g








c + i + (1 + g)iq
k∗
c + i + (1 + g)iq + 1
gk
￿
1 + g − ˜ sα (k∗
c)
α−1
￿. (6.70)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 40










+ 1   0 ⇔ 1 + g − ˜ sα (k∗
c)
α−1   0.










c   i.
From (6.1) in the proof of Lemma 1, the left-hand side of the latter inequality becomes
(1 − σ) ((1 + g)iq + i)   i, (6.71)
where the argument of i is (g,h) and the argument of g is (k∗
c,h,σ). Hence, dq∗
c/dσ > 0 at σ = 0.






c + i) + (1 + g)(iq gh + ih)
gk (k∗







c + i +
1+g
gh (iq gh + ih)
k∗
c + i +
1+g
gk (1 + iq gk) − α
gk k∗





























+ 1   0.















  0. (6.73)
The same steps that lead to (6.71) reveal that dq∗
c/dh > 0 at σ = 0.  
6.15 Proof of Proposition 9
From (4.26) we know that k1 < ˆ k induces intermediate-good ﬁrms not to undertake innovation
investments. Hence, initially k evolves according to the equation of motion (4.24) that gives rise





1−α ≤ ˆ k, then the economy never reaches the critical level of k necessary to switch into the




1−α > ˆ k, then the economy initially grows according to (4.24). However, before reaching the
steady state associated with this equation of motion it arrives at the critical level given in (4.26).
The switch into the regime with innovation investments is as described in the main text.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 41




that solves (1 + γ)(k∗ + i(g (k∗,h,σ),h)) = ˜ s(k∗)
α, which restates (3.8). First, we observe that
(4.22) and the deﬁnitions of ˆ k and ¯ k imply ¯ k > ˆ k for all γ > 0. Hence, there are parameter constella-
tions such that ¯ k > ˜ s
1
1−α > ˆ k. Next, consider the functions LHS(k) ≡ (1+γ)(k + i(g (k,h,σ),h))
and RHS(k) ≡ ˜ s(k∗)
α. The function LHS(k) satisﬁes LHS(ˆ k) = ˆ k, LHS′(k) = 1 + (1 −
α)/(2α(1 − σ)) > 1 for k ≥ ˆ k, LHS(¯ k) = ¯ k + i(γ,h,σ) > ˜ s
1
1−α. The function RHS(k) satisﬁes
RHS(ˆ k) > ˆ k because (˜ s)
1
1−α > ˆ k, and RHS(¯ k) < LHS
￿¯ k
￿
. Since LHS(k) is linear and RHS(k)
concave on (ˆ k,¯ k) both functions intersect once and only once on this interval. Since k∗ < ¯ k the
steady state involves ∆∗ ∈ (0,1) as given by (3.9).  Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 42
7 Appendix II: Phase Diagram and Local Stabil-
ity
This section develops the phase diagram and the equations underlying the local stability analysis
of the steady state characterized in Proposition 1.
7.1 Phase Diagram
We develop the phase diagram in the (∆,k) – plane.
First, consider the locus Dk ≡ kt+1 − kt. From (3.4) and omitting time subscripts, it follows that




(1 + g)(k + i) − ˜ skα
θi(k + i)
, (7.2)
and the argument of i is (g,h) and the argument of g is (k,h,σ). We summarize important
properties of (7.1) and (7.2) as Result 1.
Result 1
(a) Let k > 0, then ζ(k) = 0 if and only if k = k∗
c.
(b) The function ∆k(k) satisﬁes limk→0 ∆k(k) = 0, ∆k(k∗
c) = 1, and is continuous on k ∈ [0,k∗
c].
(c) It holds that
¯ k > k∗
c > k∗ > 0.
Proof
(a) For k > 0 the denominator of (7.2) is strictly positive. The numerator can be expressed as
LHS(k) − RHS(k), where the two functions LHS(k) and RHS(k) are those deﬁned in the proof
of Proposition 7. Then, Result 1 (a) follows from the properties of the functions LHS(k) and
RHS(k) as indicated in the proof of Proposition 7.





1 − limk→0 ζ(k)
. (7.3)





(1 + g)(k + i) − ˜ skα
θi(k + i)
= −∞. (7.4)
Hence, limk→0 ∆k(k) = 0. Moreover, ∆k(k∗
c) = 1 is immediate from (a). Continuity of ζ follows
from the continuity of the functions i and g and the fact that (1 + g)(k + i) ≤ ˜ skα for k ∈ [0,k∗
c].Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 43
(c) Follows from the proof of inequality (4.15) of Proposition 7.  
Next, we turn to the locus D∆ ≡ ∆t − ∆t−1. Omitting time subscripts, one obtains from (3.5)
D∆ = 0 ⇔ ∆t−1 ≡ ∆
∆(k) =
θi(g(k,h,σ),h)
θi(g(k,h,σ),h) + γ − g (k,h,σ)
. (7.5)
Result 2 The function ∆∆(k) has the following properties.
∆∆(0) = 0, ∆∆(¯ k) = 1, for k > 0 ∂∆∆(k)/∂k > 0, and (7.6)
for k ∈ (0,k∗
c) ∆∆(k)   ∆k(k) ⇔ k ⋚ k∗. (7.7)
Proof The properties under (7.6) follow immediately from the properties of the functions i and
g, the deﬁnition of ¯ k, and the fact that
∂∆∆(k)
∂k
= [iqgk(γ − g) + gk i]
θ
(θi + γ − g)
2 > 0 for k > 0.
The property stated under (7.7) follows from the fact that on k ∈ (0,k∗
c) the functions ∆k(k) and
∆∆(k) intersect only once at k∗ (see Proposition 1), while both are continuous and ∆k(k∗
c) = 1 >
∆∆(k∗
c) since k∗
c < ¯ k.  
To understand the forces that aﬀect the evolution of both state variables, consider the Dk = 0 -
locus ﬁrst. Above this locus, we have ∆t−1 > ∆k(k) and the right-hand side of (3.4) is greater.
Since the left-hand side is increasing in kt+1, it holds that Dk > 0. An analogous argument shows
that Dk < 0 below the Dk = 0 - locus.










Since θi(g(kt,h,σ),h)+γ −g (kt,h,σ) > 0 for all admissible values of k it holds that D∆ < 0 for
all ∆t−1 > ∆∆(k) and, similarly, D∆ > 0 for all ∆t−1 < ∆∆(k). These qualitative features are
depicted in Figure 1.
7.2 Local Stability
The steady state is a ﬁxed point of the system (3.6). To study the local behavior of the system

















We study each of the four elements of the Jacobian in turn.





































Figure 3: The Eigenvalues of the Jacobian (7.9) - A Typical Finding.
here the argument of g is (kt,h,σ), and
DEN ≡ gk (kt+1 + i) + (1 + g)(1 + iq gk), (7.11)
where the argument of g is (kt+1,h,σ) and the argument of i is (g,h). Evaluated at (k∗,∆∗),
NUMk becomes




























− 1 − iq gk
￿






















Hence, for the reason set out in the proof of Corollary 1, the ﬁrst term in (7.13) is negative.
Moreover, the last term is negative since 1 > (γ − g)/(1 + γ). Hence ∂φk(k∗,∆∗)/∂kt < 1.





























(θi + γ − g)2
θi
. (7.16)







gk − θiq gk
1 + γ
∆∗. (7.17)Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 45




1 + g − θi
1 + γ
. (7.18)
Figure 3 shows a typical result for both eigenvalues  1(θ) and  2(θ) which are strictly between zero
and one and declining in θ. The calibration uses h = 1 and the investment requirement function
i = q2. Moreover, α = 1/3, σ = 0, γ = .14, and ˜ s = .3. Hence, the steady state is locally stable.Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences and Technology Diﬀusion 46
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